Gratuitous evil is an instance of evil that an omniscient and omnipotent being could prevent it without thereby losing some greater good or creating some equal or greater evil. William Rowe believes that the existence of Gratuitous evil is a serious threat to theism. Peterson argued that the two are compatible by use of free will. According to Hesker, Patterson's strategy on Gratuitous evil is not effective. Hasker's answer falls into the category of compatibilist answers, but his view indicates an important difference, i.e. theism and the existence of Gratuitous evil are not only compatible, but also the existence of Gratuitous evil is necessary to believe in God with all the main divine attributes. Hasker uses the concept of "significant morality". In his opinion, in order for human choices to be morally significant, morality must not be undermined. According to Hasker, this answer_ unlike the libertarianism respond_ is useful when one encounters Gratuitous natural evil, because there are many moral virtues that can be realized in the face of natural suffering and Goods such as awareness, foresight, courage, caution, cooperation, etc. In this article, we examine Hasker's argument and some of the criticism that follows it.

The contemporary philosopher of religion, William Leonard Rowe (1931(, with emphasis on Gratuitous evil, has tried to show a new version of an evidential argument from evil against God. In this article we, first, try to show a detailed description and documentation of Rowe’s views and, then, have some critical remarks on it. In describing his views, we try to reveal properly the evolution of Rowe’s ideas, according to his critics’ views and his thought reformations. We have shown that the Rowe’s efforts to conclude the existence of actual Gratuitous evils from the existence of the some seemingly Gratuitous ones is not correct, and that not to find the justification for some evils does not imply that they do not have any plausible justification at all.

By introducing evidential argument, William Rowe opened a new chapter in discussions about problem of evil. Rowe’ s first formulation of the problem based on the idea that because “ it appears” that some evils in the world are Gratuitous then they are indeed so. The most influential critique of Rowe’ s argument is Stephen Wykstra’ sthat is based on the epistemological principle which is called CORNEA. He shows that in the Rowe’ s assumed situation we are not permitted to pass from “ it appears” to “ is” . According to CORNEA, considering evidence Xwe areentitled to say it appears that p, only if p were not the case, probably X was different in a discernable way. The goal of this paper is firstly to introduce CORNEA as an answer to the problem of Gratuitous evil, then introduce and assesse some selected critiques ofCORNEA and to defencethe principle and finally compare between skeptical theism-that CORNEA is an instance of – and approaches of Islamic thinkers to the problem of evil.

In Iran law often believed that legal persons have full and complete capacity (Article 588 Commerce Act). But there are some doubts about legal person’ s capacity in Gratuitous contracts: 1. whether legal person can understand "beneficence" means and if such a sense is imputable to legal person? 2. Is Gratuitous contracts compatible with legal person’ s aims and nature; especially with commercial companies? 3. What is the range of state and public institutions capacity to Gratuitous contracts? 4. Is there any capacity restriction to special Gratuitous contracts such as testament; endowment; and personal suretyship? By analyzing the purpose of gifts and by induction from Gratuitous contracts, except to cases which human relations and motivations are more important than financial aspects (such testament), or when a contract naturally specialized for human (such suretyship), or when Gratuitous contract is incompatible with the subject, aim, and philosophy of the legal person, as a general rule any beneficence contract can be signed from legal person; whether as donor or donee.

William Rowe’s various works on the evidential argument from evil now occupies a central place in the Western discussions on the problem of evil. In one of his formulations, Rowe tries to justify the atheistic belief by showing the likelihood of Gratuitous evil’s existence based on some particular instances of intense suffering. However, some of the philosophers, who are called skeptical theists, attempt to show that if there is a God, it is completely rational to accept that the humans are not in a cognitive position to make true judgments about all of the divine intentions and actions. Therefore, we cannot infer God’s justification(s) for the prescription of what seems to us to be an instance of intense suffering. Our aim in this paper is to show that skeptical theism offers a good reason to reject the evidential problem of evil developed by William Rowe.

In this paper, I propose a new response to a particular instance of the problem of evil: the problem of animal suffering. My solution, in brief, is that the rational theist may argue, justifiably, that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God would not allow Gratuitous animal suffering to occur, and, therefore, all instances of animal suffering that are encountered are not instances of Gratuitous evil. I maintain that the justification for this response to the problem of evil does not depend on the availability of a persuasive argument for the existence of God. I will focus on one category of animal suffering: the Gratuitous suffering of unseen animals. For reasons that will become clear, I think that this category of evil is the most difficult for the rational theist to explain. If this problem can be solved with my proposed defense, then, I think, any problem of animal suffering can be solved.

One of the common contracts in the Islamic banking system is the civil partnership contract adopted from voluntary trade partnership in Imamiah jurisprudence. According to Article 7 of civil partnership contract, taken from their participation in the Central Bank’ s Civil partnership model, that was approved in 2013, the responsibility for managing the company's affairs is voluntarily (Gratuitously) on the partner under the supervision of the bank and based on the agreed upon documents. As in voluntary trade partnership (properties partnership) and consequently, in the civil participation contract, the agent is entitled to be paid, Gratuitousness of the bank partner agency in the civil partnership contract will question its legitimacy. Therefore, the investigation of the authenticity and legitimacy of such a condition of the above mentioned contract is of paramount importance. In the present research, which was conducted using descriptive analytical method, it was found that the Gratuitous contract is contrary to the Islamic law and the nature of the contract. As a result, it is void and will turn the nature of the civil contract into a prohibited loan based on the religious norms.

The question of good and evil is among problems discussed by scholars and researchers from ancient times. Existence of evil affairs such as death, disease, disaster, poverty, impotence, pain, suffering, difference in creation and society, war, and Satan has caused some to believe in the lack of justice in the cosmic order. The approach of contemporary religious critiques to the question, however, has remarkably changed.Presenting answers of Islamic sages to the questions, the present essay offers the approach of some contemporary thinkers in this regard and precisely analyzes the problem from a philosophical perspective through expounding some well known opinions.

The primary challenge in addressing the problem of evils is the limitation of human knowledge in comprehending its intricate dimensions. This challenge arises from the significant role that God is perceived to play in either causing or permitting certain evils. While human beings lack the epistemic capacity to fully grasp God''''s purposes and the manner of divine intervention, God is understood as omnipotent and omniscient. Consequently, the limitations of human knowledge prevent a precise and comprehensive understanding of the complex dimensions of the evils we encounter in life. Some scholars have referred to this perspective as skeptical theism. Advocates of this approach seek to counter atheistic arguments that reject God''''s existence on the grounds of the apparent absence of rational justifications for evils—particularly Gratuitous evils. They argue that our epistemic limitations in discerning God’s reasons for allowing certain evils do not imply that such reasons do not exist. This study employs content analysis to demonstrate that, while emphasizing our epistemic limitations in understanding the problem of evil is somewhat effective in challenging atheistic arguments, excessive reliance on epistemic skepticism regarding divine intervention leads to a broader form of epistemic skepticism. As a solution, this paper proposes recognizing the diverse epistemic capacities of human beings, emphasizing the significance of a God endowed with absolute attributes, and utilizing these attributes to engage with the problem of evils.